I'm talking about encrypted messaging. Take Signal, for example: it has end-to-end encryption, which means that the company and developers don't have access to the plaintext of the messages you send. This means that they are physically incapable of sharing that plaintext with governments.
Depends on what you mean by "data". If you mean the ciphertext, then sure, they can provide that to the government, but neither they nor the government will be able to do anything with it, unless they're aware of a viable attack vector for whichever encryption algorithm they use. If you mean the plaintext, then the only way they can comply is with backdoors, which should not be acceptable.
That is exactly what they do, by definition. The EFF - among other other NGOs and technical publications - have many articles explaining why;
here's one of them for reference. You can argue that this compromise is worth it - and I would strongly disagree - but the fact that it would weaken security is inarguable.
I don't believe that "we're so far down the slippery slope that it's not worth trying to slow down" is a productive mentality.
Isn't that first video an argument against compromising E2E encryption?
I must admit that I'm confused by what your position is here, so if I've misunderstood or misrepresented what you're saying, I apologize and seek clarification.